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commercialization 10 and does not want to encourage outsiders to
invade family privacy in search of facts sufficient to support a cause
of action."
On the other hand, it may be argued: 1 2 No policy of the state
is served by granting immunity to the tortfeasor when the tort was
committed outside the scope of parental authority. The criminal or
custodial powers of the state do not always afford adequate redress
to the injured child. When death or a tort, malo anino, has put an
end to the family relation, it is pointless to talk of preserving "family
peace." Moreover, family harmony or the family exchequer will not
be impaired when the real party in interest is the insurance coxppany.
Finally, since the courts have entertained actions involving
property rights between parent and child for centuries,13 why should
they not allow certain tort actions? If the maintenance of actions,
such as conversion, between parent and child have not yet destroyed
the peace of society, why assume that a personal injury action would
be more destructive?
The instant holding is in accord with the modem tendency to
limit the rule of a parental immunity. But it is submitted that the
emphasis upon a "willful" tort in the principal case will lead to con-
fusion because the term cannot be satisfactorily defined. A modifica-
tion is offered which, although not free from difficulties, serves the
needs of society while recognizing the dignity and human worth of
the minor child: An unemancipated minor child cannot maintain an
action against his parent for a tort committed within the scope of
parental authority and without malice.
WILLS-EFFECT OF DEATH OF DISTRIBUTEE IN ACT OF SUICIDE
BY TESTATRIX - PROSPEcTIVE RIGHTS - CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST
THEORY.-Plaintiff's intestate, an infant, died as a result of gas
asphyxiation by reason of the suicide of his mother. It was not
possible to establish that the infant had survived the mother. Since
10 See Miller v. Pelzer, 159 Minn. 375, 199 N. W. 97, 98 (1924), 9 MINN.
L. REv. 76.
"1See Luster v. Luster, 299 Mass. 480, 13 N. E. 2d 438, 439 (1938).
12 It is to be noted, however, that every critic recognizes, at least by im-
plication, that the family is still the fundamental unit of society and that
therefore parents, charged with prime responsibility for the proper rearing of
tomorrow's men and women, must of necessity be accorded certain privileges
and immunities.
13 McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relations, 43 HARv. L.
REv. 1030 at p. 1058 (1930), traces this right to bring an action involving prop-
erty to a Year Book case decided in 1308.
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he was the sole beneficiary under his mother's will 1 and since his
legacy was deemed to have lapsed,2 the ptirents of the mother, de-
fendants here, were about to receive the estate as in intestacy.8
Plaintiff brought this action, contending (1) the infant son had been
wrongfully deprived of his right to his mother's estate and it would
be inequitable to allow defendants to profit from this wrong; (2) the
infant's estate has a cause of action for wrongful death. This is a
motion by defendants to dismiss the complaint for insufficiency.
4
Held, motion to dismiss the first cause of action granted. The court
stated: "The right of Douglas H. Meyer to inherit from his mother
was prospective only. He was not an heir until she died. (Riggs v.
Pahner, 115 N. Y. 506.) Hence that he might be deprived of some-
thing he might never receive gives him, or his estate, no legal
rights." 5 Thus, in effect, they held that no cause of action existed
because the son's interest was purely hypothetical. Motion to dis-
miss the second cause of action (with which we are not here con-
cerned) was granted with leave to amend the complaint. Meyer v.
Ritterbush, 196 Misc. 551, 92 N. Y. S. 2d 595 (Sup. Ct. 1949), aff'd
mere., 276 App. Div. 972, 94 N. Y. S. 2d 620 (2d Dep't 1950).
In holding the interest of this plaintiff insufficient to support a
cause of action, the court seems to have overlooked the decision of
the Court of Appeals of New York in Latham v. Father Divine.6
In that case the court held as sufficient a complaint which in ultimate
effect was legally identifiable with that of the principal case. The
testatrLx in the Latham case had expressed a desire to execute a new
will benefiting the plaintiffs. She was restrained from so doing by
the unlawful acts of the defendants, legatees of her executed will.
The Appellate Division dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint because it
found ". . . their sole interest is purely hypothetical." 7 It based its
conclusion on the fact that, even under the intended will, plaintiffs'
interest was a mere expectancy since it too might have been revoked
by the testatrix prior to her death. However, the Court of Appeals
in reversing the decision specifically refuted the reasoning of the
lower court as set forth above and held that the plaintiffs' interest
was sufficient to support their cause of action. They found it error
I N. Y. DECEDENT ESTATE LAW § 89, subd. 1, provides: "Where the title
to property or the devolution thereof depends upon priority of death and there
is no sufficient evidence that the persons have died otherwise than simultane-
ously, the property of each person shall be disposed of as if he had survived,
except as otherwise provided in this section."
2 The New York Decedent Estate Law § 29 is inoperative since the son
died without leaving a child or decedent surviving the testatrix.
3 N. Y. DECEDENT ESTATE LAW § 83, subd. 2.
4 N. Y. R. Civ. P. § 106, subd. 5.
5 196 Misc. 551, 553, 92 N. Y. S. 2d 595, 597 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
6299 N. Y. 22, 85 N. E. 2d 168 (1949).
7274 App Div. 226, 228, 81 N. Y. S. 2d 681, 683 (4th Dep't 1948).
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to have ruled as a matter of law that a constructive trust 8 could not
be impressed in such circumstances.
For consideration on a motion to dismiss, the interest of the
plaintiff in the principal case cannot be said to have less force than
that of the plaintiffs in the Lathain case. We are not here concerned
with the underlying factual differences in the two cases, nor are we
considering the cases on their respective merits. The court in the
principal case expressed no such concern, simply stating, in direct
opposition to the Court of Appeals holding, that the plaintiff had no
interest on which a court could act. because the son was neither an
heir nor legatee of the mother.
It should be noted, therefore, that the Meyer case does not rep-
resent New York law on the issue involved. The opinion is at best
a superficial treatment of the case. There is more involved in a case
such as this than the law in Riggs v. Palmer encompasses.
8 4 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 1053 (5th ed., Symons, 1941) states:
"In general, whenever the legal title to property, real or personal, has been
obtained through . . . circumstances which render it unconscientious for the
holder of the legal title to retain and enjoy the beneficial interest, equity im-
presses a constructive trust on the property thus acquired in favor of the one
who is truly and equitably entitled to the same, although he may never perhaps
have had any legal estate therein; and a court of equity has jurisdiction to
reach the property either in the hands of the original wrong-doer, or in the
hands of any subsequent holder . . . ." Cited in Moore v. Crawford, 130 U. S.
122, 128 (1888); Beatty v. Guggenheim Exploration Co., 225 N. Y. 380, 386,
122 N. E. 378, 380 (1919).
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